shown that dynamic spectrum management (DSM) using the market competitive equilibrium (CE), which sets a price for transmission power on each channel, leads to better system performance in terms of the total data transmission rate (by reducing cross talk), than using the Nash equilibrium (NE). But how to achieve such a CE is an open problem. We show that the CE is the solution of a linear complementarity problem (LCP) and can be computed efficiently. We propose a decentralized tâtonnement process for adjusting the prices to achieve a CE. We show that under reasonable conditions, any tâtonnement process converges to the CE. The conditions are that users of a channel experience the same noise levels and that the crosstalk effects between users are low-rank and weak.
I. INTRODUCTION
Dynamic spectrum management (DSM) is a technology to efficiently share the spectrum among the users in a communication system. DSM can be used in the digital subscriber line (DSL) systems to reduce crosstalk interference and improve total system throughput [3] - [5] . DSM is also a promising candidate for multiple access in cognitive radio [6] . In DSM, multiple users coexist in a channel, and this causes co-channel interference. The goal of DSM is to manage the power allocations in all the channels to maximize the sum of the data rates of all the users, subject to power constraints [3] . Unfortunately, this problem is nonconvex and cannot be solved efficiently in polynomial time [5] . While we will use game-theoretic tools to find decentralized solutions to DSM, it is worth noting that [5] give a computationally tractable but centralized optimization formulation that is asymptotically optimal as the frequency band is divided into more and more channels.
competitive game has been well-studied, e.g., [3] , [4] , [7] , [9] , and [10] . Under certain conditions the NE exists and is unique. One merit of the game theoretic formulation is that the user's problem can be solved efficiently because it is convex when holding the other users' power allocations fixed. However, the power allocation in a NE may not be socially optimal. Because of the noncooperative nature of the NE, users tend to compete for "good" channels regardless of the interferences caused to others, to the detriment of overall system efficiency, when they may all be better off using different channels to avoid interference. This is an instance of the well-known "tragedy of the commons" from economics [11] . Reference [1] presents a simple example demonstrating the inefficiency of the NE in DSM.
Therefore, we turn to the competitive market model for DSM described in [1] . (Taking a different approach to this problem, [12] analyzes a generalization of the Nash equilibrium that they call a "conjectural equilibrium.") In the competitive market model, each channel has a fictitious price per unit power, and each user purchases some power allocation in these channels, given her budget constraint, to maximize her data rate. The prices are determined by a central manager to keep the total power allocated in each channel to be below a spectral mask. A competitive equilibrium (CE) of a market model is a set of prices and the corresponding power allocations which maximizes all users' utility and clears the market, i.e., makes the total power allocated meet the spectral mask. While the CE has received a lot of recent attention in computer science, its application to resource management for communication systems appears rare. The existence of a CE for DSM was proven in [1] . Also, [2] showed that the CE achieves greater social utility (total transmission rate) than the NE, with properly assigned budgets to guarantee fairness among all users. It is worth noting that the algorithm proposed in [2] to determine the budgets has low communication complexity because it only requires the data rate of each user rather than the complete channel state information. However, how to find a CE prices efficiently is an open problem. Traditionally, the prices are determined by distributed, auction-type algorithms called tâ-tonnement processes [11] . But it is not known whether such processes converge with the Shannon utility function. This paper focuses on determining the CE of the competitive market model for DSM and makes three contributions. We first show that the CE is the solution of a linear complementarity problem (LCP) [13] despite the apparent nonlinearity of the problem. [4] showed a similar result for the NE. Second, we show that when the interference coefficients are user symmetric, then the problem is equivalent to finding KKT points of a quadratic program (QP), for which a fully polynomial-time approximation scheme (FPTAS) exists [14] . Lastly, we present decentralized tâtonnement processes to solve the CE, where the manager adjusts the prices based on the excess demand (the difference between the total power and the spectral mask). We prove under some low-rank conditions, the prices converge to the equilibrium prices (hence the tâ-tonnement processes converge to the CE).
The paper is organized as follows. The next section presents the problem formulation. Section III presents the LCP formulation and the FPTAS result, and Section IV is about decentralized price-adjustment tâtonnment processes. We conclude in Section VI. Technical proofs are in the Appendix.
The notation in this paper is conventional. We use lower case, bold letters for vectors and capital, bold letters for matrices. X X X 0 and x x x 0 are elementwise inequalities while X X X 0 and X X X 0 indicate that X X X is semi-positive definite and positive definite, respectively. In addition, I I I is the identity matrix; (X X X) is the spectral radius of X X X; X X X y is the Moore-Penrose pseudoinverse of X X X; and (x) + := maxfx; 0g.
1053-587X/$26.00 © 2010 IEEE x ij c j , for regulatory reasons. For example, in overlay cognitive radio [6] , we may want to limit the interference experienced by the primary user due to transmissions from secondary users. (In that case we should actually scale the power allocations so that x ij represents the power received by the primary user on channel j from user i. Such a scaling carries through the analysis cleanly.) To achieve an efficient allocation of spectrum we associate a price p j > 0 with each channel j. discusses how to choose the users' budgets.) The spectrum manager adjusts the prices, so that eventually the "market clears": the demand in each channel,
x ij , equals the supply, c j . In the weak-interference regime, user i's utility is her total data transmission rate across all the channels (Shannon utility):
Here,
x x x i = [x x x 1 ; . . . ; x x x i01 ; x x x i+1 ; . . . ; x x
x n ] > is the power allocation of the other n 0 1 users; ij > 0 is the noise level experienced by user i on channel j; and a j ik 0 is the crosstalk coefficient for interference to user i on channel j from user k 6 = i. The optimal power allocation x x x 3 i (p p p; x x xi) of user i, when she faces prices p p p and power allocations x x xi of the other users, is determined by the following convex optimization problem
which has a unique solution because it is strictly convex. Fig. 1 illustrates this competitive market model.
The CE [11] of this model is the vector of prices p p p 3 and the corresponding user-optimal power allocations fx 3 ij g so that the market clears,
x ij = c j . Reference [1] proved the existence of a CE in this model. It can be easily shown that, given p p p, each users' power allocation problem (2) has a water-filling solution:
where the dual variable i 0 is determined by the budget constraint p p p > x x x i w i ; which is tight at the CE [1] .
III. CE AS LCP
By applying the fact that x = y + is equivalent to x y^x(x0y) = 0^x 0 to (3) (7) is also monotone. In that case an LCP solution can be computed in polynomial time [13] . Applying this fact and the fact that a KKT point of a QP can be computed by an FPTAS [14] to (6) to assume that the ij are very small and equal because they are given by the specification to which the transmitters and receivers are built. Weak-interference is a standard assumption for DSL and is reasonable in some situations for wireless communication systems.
IV. TÂTONNEMENT PROCESS FOR SPECTRUM MANAGEMENT
In this section, we present a decentralized algorithm for solving the CE. In the centralized approach as described above, the spectrum manager gathers all the parameters and then publishes the optimal power allocations. However, in the decentralized approach each user only sends her current power allocations and receives the channel prices from the manager. This reduces the communication between users and distributes the computational load to the users. The paper [15] provides a summary of the benefits of distributed algorithms over centralized ones.
Given the channel prices p p p, the power allocations can be found by water filling. The key question is how to adjust the prices and to ensure that the process converges quickly to a CE. Tâtonnement processes [11] are a broad class of price-update rules that adjusts the price based on the excess demand: if the supply on channel j, cj, exceeds the total demand, i x ij , then decrease the price p j (increase it if the demand falls short of supply). The users and the manager then alternate between updating their power allocations and updating the channel prices, respectively, until the difference between demand and supply is small. The condition for the convergence of a tâtonnement process is known as weak gross substitutability (WGS).
Theorem 3:
1) Suppose prices for each product j are adjusted continuously by dp j (t) dt = fj(yj(p p p(t)))
where fj(1) is a sign preserving function (i.e., signfj(y) = sign y) and y j is a measure of the excess of product j. 
where fj(1) is a sign preserving function (i.e., signfj(y) = sign y) and y j is a measure of the excess of product j. Then y y y t ! 0 if weak gross substitutability holds, that is, @ l y j (p p p) 0 for all l 6 = j.
Proof: Part 1 is Theorem 4.1 of [16] (also found in [11] ) while part 2 is proved in [17] .
With some conditions, we can prove WGS for our competitive market model. For algebraic simplicity, we use excess revenue instead of excess demand (this is without loss of generality since for each j, the factor pj could easily be incorporated into fj(y)). 
V. NUMERICAL EXAMPLES
We present three examples with n = 10 users and fewer channels than users (m = 6), an equal number of channels and users (m = 10), and more channels than users (m = 14) channels, respectively. The crosstalk coefficients are independent random samples from the uniform distribution on [0; 1=(n01)], ensuring that the weak interference condition is satisfied. The noise levels satisfy the equal noise condition, and the j are independent random samples from the uniform distribution on [0; 1]. For all i and j, w i = 1 and c j = 1. Fig. 2 shows how channel prices with a decentralized tâtonnment process converge to the CE prices calculated with the LCP in (6). After 100 iterations of the tâ-tonnement process, the relative difference between each user's utility and their utility at the CE is less than 10 03 . For these examples, we compare a modified CE to the NE (where each user's total transmission power is limited to 1). To not favor the CE, we scale each users' power allocations in the CE to match the NE's limit on the total transmission power per user. Thus, the modified CE obeys the power constraints imposed on the NE, and its performance is no better than that of the true CE. We find that the average user's utility at this modified CE is higher than at the NE by 5%, 6%, and 2%, respectively. (We calculate the NE with the LCP in [4] .) Reference [2] has more comparisons of the CE and the NE. 
VI. CONCLUSION
We considered a competitive market model for dynamic spectrum management of a communication system. We showed that the problem of finding the competitive equilibrium can be formulated as an LCP and solved efficiently. Besides the centralized LCP solution, we also proposed decentralized tâtonnement processes for adjusting prices. We proved that these processes convergence to the CE under certain conditions. In our model, each user's budget constraint implicitly limits their total transmission power. We plan to extend this model by incorporating explicit limits on the transmission power of each user and by relaxing the weak-interference assumption and the low-rank assumptions on the matrices A A A j of crosstalk coefficients. Let us look at the left hand limit (the right hand limit will be similar).
There is a small open interval (t 0 ; t) in which the active set of the LCP is constant. Let the set S j be the active set of channel j, S j := fi : sij = 0g and I I Ij the n 2 n matrix so that 
Thus, for j 6 = l, 
The equal noise condition and Lemma 8 then prove the claim. The following lemmas are needed in the above proofs. 
